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Abstract. The rise of large business corporations in the late 19th century
compelled many American observers to admit that the nature of the corporation
had yet to be understood. Published in this context, Ernst Freund’s little-known
The Legal Nature of Corporations (1897) was an original attempt to come to
terms with a new legal and economic reality. But it can also be described, to
paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes, as the earliest example of the rational study
of corporate law. The paper shows that Freund had the intuitions of an
institutional economist, and engaged in what today would be called comparative
institutional analysis. Remarkably, his argument that the corporate form secures
property against insider defection and against outsiders anticipated recent work
on entity shielding and capital lock-in, and can be read as an early contribution to
what today would be called the theory of the firm.
1. Introduction
Until recently few theorists of the firm subscribed to the idea that legal personality
or legal entity status is an important part of the explanation of the nature of the
firm.1 Likewise, legal entity status played little or no role in the economic analysis
of corporate law. On the rare occasions when it was mentioned in either of these
literatures the suggestion that firms and similar organizations are endowed by
law with personhood, namely the capacity to attract rights and duties arising
in legal relations, separate from the capacities of all the human beings involved,
was dismissed as a convenient legal fiction or portrayed as a source of misleading
reification (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Klein,
1982; Meckling and Jensen, 1983; Posner, 1990; Tullock, 1971).
By contrast, legal entity status features prominently in more recent scholarship
on the firm (Ayotte and Hansmann, 2015; Blair, 2012; Blair and Stout,
1999; Deakin et al., 2017; Deakin, forthcoming; Gindis, 2016; Hansmann
and Kraakman, 2000a; Hodgson, 2002; Hansmann et al., 2006; Iacobucci and
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1 The terms ‘legal personality’ and ‘legal entity status’ are used interchangeably in this paper.
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Triantis, 2007; Kornhauser and MacLeod, 2013; Orts, 2013; Spulber, 2009;
Triantis, 2012; Van den Steen, 2010). Much of this work revolves around
two key claims: first, legal entity status fulfils important economic functions
overlooked in previous research; and second, legal entity status requires what
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman (2000a) call ‘organizational law’.2
The functions performed by legal entity status cannot be created by contract
alone.
When law assigns legal entity status to a firm set up by an entrepreneur
or a group of entrepreneurs following some specified procedure (registration
or incorporation) it creates a distinct legal person with a unified capacity for
property, contract and litigation that is the focal point of the firm’s economic
activities. This legal person, in which ownership rights to assets are vested,
performs the function of a transaction-cost economizing nexus for contracts with
investors, suppliers, employees, customers and other parties, not simply because
of the efficiency-enhancing property of contractual centralization noted long ago
by Ronald Coase (1937), but also because ‘asset partitioning’ (Hansmann and
Kraakman, 2000a, 2000b) allows the firm to bond its contractual and financial
commitments irrespective of changes in its membership.
Following Hansmann, Kraakman and Richard Squire (2006), different types
of firm can be distinguished depending on the degree of separation between the
firm’s assets and the founders’ personal assets, and more precisely the degree to
which the former are legally protected from the founders’ personal creditors. All
firms enjoy ‘weak entity shielding’, whereby the firm’s creditors have priority
over claims to the firm’s assets made by the founders’ personal creditors. But
only a subset of firms benefit from ‘strong entity shielding’, the crucial tests
being whether founders can unilaterally withdraw some or all of their share of
the firm’s assets, and whether the founders’ personal creditors can force a partial
liquidation of the firm’s assets to satisfy their claims.3 These tests demarcate
partnerships from corporations: only the latter benefit from the liquidation
protection characteristic of strong entity shielding.
The corporation’s advantage stems less from limited shareholder liability
than from the fact that that corporate assets are literally ‘locked-in’, to borrow
Margaret Blair’s (2004) expression, without locking in any particular investors.4
2 Organizational law comprises ‘the bodies of law that govern standard legal entities such as business
corporations, partnerships, cooperatives, non-profit organizations, trusts [and] limited liability companies’
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000b: 807).
3 To achieve even weak entity shielding by contract an entrepreneur would need to get personal
creditors to agree to subordinate their claims to those of business creditors, and to credibly promise
business creditors that all past and future personal creditors have and will agree to subordinate their
claims. To sustain these commitments by contract would be a “transaction-cost nightmare”’ (Langlois,
forthcoming).
4 Limited liability, or ‘owner shielding’ in Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire’s (2006) terminology, is
a supporting feature that can potentially be achieved by contract.
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This allows investors to diversify and capital markets to develop, favoring the
operation of large firms by facilitating the accumulation of equity in view of
building up long-term investments. Specific investments that may otherwise be
foregone, given the collective action and commitment problems inherent in team
production situations, are further enhanced by the fact that corporate assets
are controlled by an independent board whose primary concern, according
to Blair and Lynn Stout (1999), is to balance the competing interests of
all those involved in order to protect the firm’s going concern value over
time.
This paper argues that the main thrust of this more recent scholarship was
anticipated by Ernst Freund in a little-known book, The Legal Nature of
Corporations, published in 1897.5 Some historians of American corporate law
have identified Freund as an ‘important theorist’ (Millon, 1990: 215) and have
characterized his book as a ‘brilliant exposition’ (Mark, 1987: 1474) of the
‘theoretical underpinnings of corporation law’ (Carrington, 1994: 488, n.11).
Yet to date references to this ‘brilliant study’ (Horwitz, 1985: 202), which was
arguably well ‘ahead of its time’ (Harris, 2006: 1472), are rare, and a systematic
assessment of its contributions remains unavailable. The purpose of this paper
is to propose such an assessment, and to show why Freund’s recognition as an
important corporate theorist is long overdue.
Published at a time when the rise of business corporations compelled many
American observers, including leading economists and lawyers, to admit that the
nature of the corporation had yet to be understood, Freund’s book represented
an original attempt to come to terms with a new legal and economic reality.
But more importantly, it can best be described, to paraphrase Oliver Wendell
Holmes, as the earliest example of the ‘rational study’ of corporate law. Indeed,
Freund devoted himself to the ‘study of the ends sought’ by corporate law ‘and the
reasons for desiring them’ (Holmes, 1897: 1005).6 The paper shows that Freund
5 Freund (1864–1932) was born in New York but grew up and was educated in Germany. After
obtaining a doctorate in law from Heidelberg in 1884 he practised law in New York. In 1894, while
pursuing doctoral studies in political science at Columbia, the result of which was published as The Legal
Nature of Corporations, he joined the faculty of political science at the recently-founded University of
Chicago. When the Law School opened in 1902 Freund was a member of its original faculty, playing a
significant role in the design of its distinctive interdisciplinary curriculum (Ellsworth, 1977; Mordfin and
Nagorsky, 2011). Best known as a pioneer of American administrative law, he was also a founder of
the American Political Science Association and a member of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (Allen, 1965; Ernst, 2014; Firmage, 1962; Kent, 1933; Kraines, 1974). His
major works are Police Power (Freund, 1904), Standards of American Legislation (Freund, 1917) and
Administrative Powers of Persons and Property (Freund, 1928).
6 Holmes (1897) famously called for the ‘rational study of law’ that examined the reasons for legal
rules in terms of their social value instead of merely referring, as was then customary, to court cases
and authorities from the past. Exponents of the rational approach, Holmes predicted, would mobilize
statistics and economics in assessing the ends, means and costs of rules. Freund was not a man of statistics
but shared this conception of legal science.
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had the intuitions of an institutional economist, and engaged, implicitly at least,
in what today would be called comparative institutional analysis. Moreover, it
is possible to read his argument about the value of legal entity status as an early
contribution to what today would be recognized as the theory of the firm.
Although Freund’s analysis was rudimentary by today’s standards, his claims
that the corporate form secures property both against insider defection and
against outsiders in ways unavailable in partnerships, and that law is necessary to
achieve this result, sound remarkably prescient. In order to establish why ‘Freund
deserves to be rediscovered’ (Reitz, 1993: 435) as an unjustly neglected precursor
of contemporary work on firms and legal entities, this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 provides context by underlining the state of the late 19th-
century American understanding of corporations. A detailed examination of
Freund’s corporate theory follows in section 3, while section 4 reflects on its
relevance both then and now, with a specific focus on the similarities between
Freund’s ideas and recent work on the firm. Section 5 concludes.
2. Corporate theory in 19th-century America
The generally accepted narrative regarding the development of 19th-century
theories of the corporation in America draws parallels with the transformations
of corporate law itself (Horwitz, 1992; Hurst, 1970). Prior to the widespread
liberalization of state incorporation laws in the late 19th century, when special
charters were granted primarily to ventures, such as utilities and banks, that
were deemed to be in the public interest (Evans, 1948), incorporation was
viewed as a state-granted privilege or franchise. According to this ‘concession
theory’ of the corporation, accepted by luminaries such as James Kent (1827)
or Joseph K. Angell and Samuel Ames (1832), and duly upheld by the Supreme
Court, corporations were state-created artificial persons whose powers were
strictly limited by their charters, with the implication that acts not explicitly
authorized by the state and expressed as such in their charters were legally null
and void.7
But as special charters came to be associated with legislative favoritism, a
key feature of post-Jacksonian populist reform was to make charters ‘freely’
available, and incorporation under general statutes a simple administrative
matter (Hovenkamp, 1991;Hurst, 1982). By the 1880s any group of corporators,
regardless of the object of their venture, obtained the right to incorporate by
simple registration, at a standard fee, provided that a certain set of requirements
was met. In the laissez-faire setting of the Gilded Age, the period that witnessed
7 The notion that the state grants ‘artificial personality’ to corporations, as distinct from the ‘natural
personality’ of man, goes back to Roman law. In the Middle Ages this distinction acquired a theological
justification: since only divine power could create true persons endowed with reason and a soul, the
persons created by secular powers must be artificial, fictitious and soulless.
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the emergence of American industrial capitalism, the principle that corporations
were public concessions of privileges gave way to the view that corporations were
the products of private rights and freedom of contract, in appearance confirming
Henry Sumner Maine’s (1861) observation that progressive societies were driven
by a movement ‘from status to contract’.
In this context, the new corporate theory proposed in A Treatise on the
Law of Private Corporations by Wall Street corporate lawyer Victor Morawetz
(1882) suggested that ‘the idea of a corporation d[id] not necessarily imply a
grant of corporate power by statute’ (Morawetz, 1882: 24). The doctrine that
corporations existed and acted ‘only when authorized by . . . the legislature’,
Morawetz (1882: 3) pointed out, failed to come to terms with the facts.
Unincorporated associations were often ‘considered as personified entities, acting
as a unit, and in one name’ (Morawetz, 1882: 24) both in business dealings
and in the courts, and although ‘unauthorized use[s] of corporate powers’
and acts performed by de facto corporations, namely ‘corporation[s] existing
without authority of law’ (Morawetz, 1882: 134), were punishable by the
state, courts often viewed them as legally valid in order to avoid injustice to
third parties.
The differences between corporations and partnerships, Morawetz reasoned,
were less important than was commonly assumed. Both were voluntary
associations ‘formed by agreement of [their] members for the sake of pecuniary
gain’ (Morawetz, 1882: 3). In fact, ‘there [was] no reason . . . why a number
of individuals should not be permitted to form a corporation of their own
free will, and without first obtaining permission from the legislature, just as
they may form a partnership or enter into ordinary contracts with each other
(Morawetz, 1882: 24), save perhaps to prevent fraud. The new corporate law
statutes helped mitigate the risk of fraud by imposing a requirement of due
notice of incorporation for the benefit of third parties, most notably creditors,
but beyond that, Morawetz seemed to imply, corporate law might be dispensed
with.
Although corporate law formally created artificial persons with rights and
duties of their own, it was imperative ‘to bear in mind distinctly’, warned
Morawetz (1882: 2), ‘that the existence of a corporation independently of its
shareholders is a fiction; and that the rights and duties of an incorporated
association’, particularly as related to property, were ‘in reality the rights and
duties of the persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being’. Since
‘a corporation and its members [were] in reality one and the same’ (Morawetz,
1882: 565–6), it was clear that ‘ownership of everything belonging to an ordinary
trading corporation [was] in the persons who compose it’ (Morawetz, 1882:
385), and that ‘debts due a corporation [were] in reality due to the body of
stockholders’ (Morawetz, 1882: 621).
Morawetz’s partnership analogy, and the attendant invitation to dismiss the
corporation’s separate personality, were accepted by many legal scholars in
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S174413741700056X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. The University of Hertfordshire, on 08 Dec 2017 at 10:07:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
6 DAVID GINDIS
search for a replacement for the defunct concession theory.8 ‘The fiction of
the “legal person”’, wrote lawyer and historian Henry O. Taylor (1884: iv), was
little more than an ‘unnecessary mystification’ that had ‘outlived its usefulness’ in
the modern world. If substance was to be preferred over form, only the rights of
the actual human beings involved mattered. After all, as Taylor (1884: 14) put it,
in terms of ‘physical existences’ there was only ‘a collection of [natural] persons’.9
This ‘aggregate theory’ of the corporation, lauded by a later commentator as the
first attempt to ‘see the corporation as it really is’ (Seymour, 1903: 549), soon
found an echo in the courts. It informed key Supreme Court rulings in the 1880s,
most notably Santa Clara.10
Paradoxically, although Santa Clara and the legislative ethos of the 1880s
seemed to have legitimized the corporation as a private institution by using
the partnership analogy, thereby favoring the emergence of big business, it was
precisely the emergence of big business that led to the demise of aggregate theory
by the end of the 1890s. The wave of horizontal integration in American industry
that began in the mid-1890s after the passage of general incorporation laws for
holding companies in New Jersey led to unprecedented corporate growth and
market concentration, underpinned by the rapid development of a market for
industrial securities. Over half of the consolidations undertaken during this ‘great
mergermovement’ absorbedmore than 40%of their industries, and about a third
absorbed more than 70% (Chandler, 1990; Lamoreaux, 1985).
In light of these developments, as legal historians fromMortonHorwitz (1985)
to Richard Adelstein (2012) have explained, it became difficult to argue that
the increasingly concentrated manufacturing conglomerates that were engaged
in large-scale activities spanning multiple states, and had large and growing
numbers of shareholders, were essentially like partnerships. Indeed, it became
hard to deny the reality of corporate organization, as something distinct from
an aggregate of shareholders, when vast economic power increasingly lay in
the hands of professional managers and ‘absentee ownership’, to use Thorstein
Veblen’s (1923) famous expression, was more often than not the norm. In the
1890s, however, an alternative theory of the corporation was unavailable in
America.
The need for a new theory was reinforced by the fact that the uses and abuses
of the corporate formwere at the forefront of the public debate. A new generation
8 This development was aided by the popularity of Morawetz’s treatise which, by the time of its
second edition in 1886, had become a standard text in law schools. With its meticulous references to
several thousand court cases it was considered as ‘the best treatise on the subject of corporations’ available
by James Barr Ames, the influential Dean of Harvard Law School (cited in McClure, 2015: 3).
9 Prominent proponents of this view included Seymour D. Thompson (1895) and William L. Clark
(1897). For a particularly clear statement see Benjamin Trapnell (1897).
10 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 US 394 (1886) extended the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause and, by implication, due process, to corporate property, making it
more difficult to tax differently from personal property.
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of muckraker journalists revealed practices of price fixing, rate discrimination,
ruthless predatory tactics and outright fraud, contributing to the widespread
perception that corporations were the ‘tool of plutocracy’ and a ‘danger to the
republic’, as corporate lawyer and entrepreneur William W. Cook (1891: 251)
put it. The sentiment that corporations had grown too large to be effectively
constrained by state legislation, combined with the reluctance of courts to issue
proceedings across state boundaries, put pressure on Congress, which responded
by introducing the first federal regulations of corporate activity.11
Like many of their contemporaries, the founders of the American Economic
Association observed these developments with apprehension. The problem with
the new breed of corporations was not simply that they rendered obsolete the
old rules of business conduct, wrote Henry Carter Adams (1891: 75), but that
they laid claim to ‘privileges . . . originally intended for individuals alone’.
Indeed, they ‘interfered with the effective workings of the accepted system of
jurisprudence, pertaining to the significance of rights and to the relation between
rights and responsibilities’ (Adams, 1897: 16–20). With limited liability, Richard
T. Ely (1887: 976) concurred, ‘themoral element [wa]s at its minimum’: everyone
involved in a corporation felt that they ‘[could not] be held personally responsible
for its immoral conduct’.12
The fact that in large corporations the ‘ownership of capital [wa]s separated
from its management’ (Ely, 1887: 973) meant that what the Cambridge
economist D. H. Robertson (1923) later called capitalism’s ‘golden rule’, namely
the virtuous association of control with risk, was violated. The transformations
of the American economy were so profound that traditional conceptions,
including the belief that the power of making business decisions was most wisely
exercised by those who stood to lose the most, a principle that made sense in
a world of local competition between small businesses owners, needed to be
reconsidered. But the fact that ‘the nature of corporations ha[d] not yet been
fully explained’, observed Ely (1887: 975–7), was an impediment to any serious
attempt to find ‘some contrivance which will render artificial persons amenable
to the moral law’ of liability.
Similar conceptual concerns ran through the Congressional debates
surrounding the problem of corporate taxation (Bank, 2010; Joseph, 2004). As
the wealth held by the rising class of industrialists and bankers was increasingly
taking the form of stock ownership, legislatures responding to public perceptions
that the holders of this new wealth were not bearing their ‘fair share’ of the tax
burden (Bank, 2010: 40), or were simply seeking to expand their tax base, were
confronted with the question of how to reach this wealth. Since existing tax
11 A federal Interstate Commerce Commission was set up in 1887 to deal with pricing abuses by
railroad corporations, and steps were taken to restrict combinations including the Sherman Antitrust Act
in 1890 (Berk, 1997; Sklar, 1988).
12 Similar concerns were voiced by American classical economists (Giocoli, 2017).
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laws made no mention of corporations, having been devised when corporations
were small and scarce, the only way forward was to assume that the property of
artificial and natural persons was equally liable.
Taxing corporate property, however, was seen as taxing shareholders, given
both the prevailing aggregate theory of the corporation and, as one would
expect, protests from industrialists, bankers and other investors that they would
be subjected to unfair double taxation. But while double taxation was ‘not
necessarily unjust’, wrote Edwin R. A. Seligman (1890: 636), the Columbia
economist who would soon become the nation’s leading authority on public
finance, clearly the idea of corporate taxation required some justification. Indeed,
as Cook (1891: 102) put it, ‘how to tax corporations, and how to tax them fully,
yet fairly’, was ‘one of the most perplexing problems’ of the day. Proposals to
tax corporations at the federal level only compounded the problem.
A first attempt in this direction was made in the Revenue Act of 1894. The Act
was struck down by the Supreme Court in 1895 even though, as the distinguished
editor of the American Law Register, the country’s oldest law journal, George
Wharton Pepper (1895: 296) wryly observed, ‘the nature of the corporation
[was] still under discussion’, and indeed despite strong differences of opinion
regarding this key question among the Justices themselves.13 Arguably, the lack
of consensus concerning what constituted a ‘taxable entity’ (Joseph, 2004: 86),
and uncertainty regarding the equally important question of where to draw its
boundaries, was in no small measure the result of the prevailing conceptual
confusion about the nature of the corporation.
While the partnership analogy was a way to explain what Michigan lawyer
and economist John Patterson Davis (1897: 280) called the ‘voluntary inception’
of corporations, a salient fact in the era of general incorporation, the claim that
artificial personality was a metaphysical relic of the past that had outlived its
usefulness seemed disputable. The ‘existence of a corporation as a legal entity’,
wrote Baltimore lawyer Henry Winslow Williams (1899: 5), was not imaginary
but a ‘legal fact of the greatest practical importance’ (Williams, 1899: 10). In the
words of Dwight Arven Jones (1892: 80), a prominent member of the New York
Bar, since the treatment of ‘a corporation [as] a legal person’ was ‘necessary
both to secure public rights against the corporation and to secure corporate
rights against the public’, the matter clearly warranted further investigation.
It is in this context that Freund’s Legal Nature of Corporations was written
and published. It is unclear whether it was Freund’s intention to address the gaps
in the American understanding of corporations, to show that corporations were
not a danger to society, or to tackle, indirectly at least, the legislative problems of
the day. Although in the preface he claimed that the investigation that followed
was ‘without immediate . . . reference to practical questions’ (Freund, 1897:
13 The Court later upheld the Corporate Tax Act of 1909. The principle of corporate taxation was
firmly established in the Revenue Act of 1913.
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5), he acknowledged that his objective of establishing analytically the idea of
‘the corporation [a]s a distinct person in law’ (Freund, 1897: 10) might be
of some practical value. In any case, Freund proposed a novel theory of the
corporation that is well worth examining in some detail. As the rest of this paper
demonstrates, his approach stood out in more ways than one.
3. Freund’s rational study of corporate law
A distinguishing mark of Freund’s book was its decidedly analytical approach. It
was insufficient, Freund believed, to enumerate differences between incorporated
and unincorporated associations, and unsatisfactory to rely on court cases and
authorities from the past. And it was certainly unacceptable to make claims
about such important matters as the nature of the corporation without at least
some justification. The popular position exemplified by Morawetz and others at
the time, who ‘repudiate[d] the notion of the fictitious and artificial person’ but
‘deem[ed] it perfectly sufficient to proclaim the conception as false and contrary
to reality’ without ‘even attempt[ing] an explanation’ (Freund, 1897: 12) of why
the notion even existed in law, simply begged the question.14
For Freund, the issue of whether the corporation was a public concession or a
private association was misleading because neither perspective clearly explained
the role played by its distinct personality. Freund proposed to address this
question from the point of view of property law. If, as Morawetz had argued,
corporations were essentially like partnerships, and all corporate property was
in reality the shareholders’ property, why would individuals forming a business
association choose the corporate form over the partnership or other forms of
joint ownership? What indispensable functions were performed by corporate
law, besides the prevention of fraud? No previous attempt to examine the
value of the corporate form from this perspective had been proposed. It is in
this sense that Freund’s book was the earliest example of the rational study of
corporate law.
Freund’s property perspective, and his approach, which contains the basic
ingredients of what today would be recognized as comparative institutional
analysis, led him to formulate answers that anticipated the thrust of recent work
on firms and legal entities (Blair and Stout, 1999; Hansmann et al., 2006). In
modern terms, Freund reasoned that members of business associations faced
collective action and commitment problems, and that these were more or less
mitigated by their choice of legal form, which varied in its capacity to secure
property against both insider defection and against outsiders. This led him to
demonstrate that the chief characteristics of the corporate form, namely a distinct
personality and an independent board, offered the strong protections that neither
contractual arrangements nor partnership law could achieve.
14 Freund’s attitude was far from commonplace among American legal scholars in the 1890s.
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A stepping stone in Freund’s thinking involved a reassessment of some of the
fundamental conceptions underlying corporate theory. Like anyone studying law
in Germany during the 1880s Freund was familiar with the corporate personality
controversy (Gindis, 2009; Iwai, 1999), and had been exposed to the teachings of
Otto von Gierke, a towering figure of the historical school whose Das Deutsche
Genossenschaftsrecht led the attack on the concession theory associated with
the school’s founder, Friedrich Carl von Savigny. For Gierke, corporations were
private associations but they were more than aggregates of their members. An
organized and cohesive group such as a corporation was like ‘a living organism
and a real person, with body and members, and a will of its own’ (Maitland,
1900: xxvi). Its personality stemmed from its group will, which pre-existed its
incorporation; incorporation merely acknowledged an already existing fact.
Freund was the first to discuss Gierke’s ‘real person’ theory of the corporation
in America.15 While Horwitz (1985: 218) may be right that he sought to
translate Gierke’s ideas ‘for a practical-minded and anti-metaphysical American
Bar’, Freund understood that Gierke’s organicism and Morawetz’s aggregate
view suffered from the same defects. The failure of these ‘prevailing theories
of corporate existence’, Freund explained, was due to their reliance on the
‘orthodox view’ of the nature of rights, namely that ‘undivided personal volition
[wa]s essential to the holding of a right’ (Freund, 1897: 49). It was the implicit
acceptance of this will theory of rights that led Morawetz to reduce corporate
rights and duties to individual rights and duties, and its explicit acceptance that
led Gierke to see ‘every corporate act [a]s the manifestation of corporate will
and therefore of corporate personality’ (Freund, 1897: 76).
For Freund, a more adequate theory of corporations was one that rejected
Gierke’s ‘strained view of the corporation as a real person’ (Freund, 1897: 76).
Corporations were not, as he sarcastically put it, ‘a new and distinct species of
humanity’ (Freund, 1897: 52). At the same time, the requisite theory needed
to account for the undeniable fact eschewed by Morawetz that for most, if not
all, practical purposes law treated ‘corporation and member as two absolutely
different holders’ of rights and duties (Freund, 1897: 41). The challenge was to
show that corporate rights and duties were not ‘abnormal and illogical’ (Freund,
1897: 48), and that ‘the treatment of the corporation as a legal person’ (Freund,
1897: 83) was justified ‘in connection with property and not with governmental
rights’ or privileges (Freund, 1897: 9).
In order to make sense of the corporation’s status as a legal person, which
Freund viewed as an ‘instrument of legal reasoning’ (Freund, 1897: 83) used to
15 Freund’s book was published before Frederick W. Maitland’s famous translation of sections of
Volume 3 of the monumentalGenossenschaftsrecht (Gierke, 1900), but it was the latter, given its author’s
stature as the pre-eminent English legal historian of his day, that was instrumental in disseminating
Gierke’s ideas in the Anglo-American world (Harris, 2006).
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determine the incidence of legal acts,16 Freund believed that another orthodox
principle, namely that control over and interest in property must coincide in the
same natural person, a principle that sat well with thewill theory of rights, needed
to be rejected. When rights were more usefully construed, following Rudolf von
Jhering, as ‘legally protected interests’, the economic benefits of which were
secured by some ‘active . . . element of control’ (Freund, 1897: 15),17 it became
easy to see that the ‘two elements of a right, control and interest’ (Freund,
1897: 17), particularly as related to property, were frequently separated. This
possibility was particularly relevant to the corporate theorist.18
Of course, corporations could not be explained by the mere fact of ‘separation
of control and interest’ (Freund, 1897: 16).19 Property held in trust, for instance,
involved a separation but lacked the voluntary act of association that was
essential to corporations. Likewise, corporations could not be understood by the
mere fact of voluntary association. Private associations formed for the pursuit
of common interests, such as literary societies, could achieve ‘natural cohesion
and organization’ (Freund, 1897: 22), but were ‘legally irrelevant’. Associations
of this kind could not enter into contracts or become parties to litigation in their
own right, any more than they could hold property in their own name. These
features involved the exercise of ‘legal control with reference to [the] common
interests’ (Freund, 1897: 21), and had to be constructed artificially, as it were,
by either courts or statute law.20
To understand the role of law, and how an analytically meaningful distinction
between partnerships and corporations could be derived, it was important to
recognize why business associations were formed in the first place, and to
consider the problems that associates were likely to face. As Freund (1897: 19)
explained, in any association based on a ‘combination of resources’, the purpose
of which was to ‘bring returns to each party far in excess of what he would
procure by the separate and independent employment of his own means’, a key
16 Legal persons, wrote Freund (1897: 81), were simply ‘distinctive parties of legal relations’. An
advantage of this view of legal personhood, which is independent of the flesh-and-blood human being
and the issue of volition, is that it avoids anthropomorphism and equivocation (Gindis, 2016).
17 From his exposure to German jurisprudence Freund (1890) retained above all the teachings of
Jhering, whose influence on his view that ‘the rule of law arises out of the conflict of human interests,
which it tempers and regulates in accordance with the necessities of social existence’ (Freund, 1897: 15), is
clear. Jhering’s (1879) jurisprudence was already translated and well known in America. Holmes (1881:
208) in particular referred to Jhering as ‘a man of genius’.
18 Freund (1897: 48) explained: ‘In dealing with associations of persons we must modify the ideas
. . . derived from the right of property in individuals [i.e. coincidence of control and interest], and what
has first seemed to be an anomaly will appear simply as [a] legitimate form of development’.
19 This expression is equivalent to the common phrase, ‘separation of ownership and control’. Freund
had in mind control over and interest in (or ownership of) property.
20 While he acceptedGierke’s idea that organized and cohesive associationsweremore than aggregates
of their members, Freund (1897: 6) set aside ‘the subject of association as a factor in economic, social and
political life’ to focus on the ‘corporation as a legal institution’ only.
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issue was whether the associates needed to exercise joint control to pursue their
common interests. Given that disagreements over the proper course of action
could arise, and in fact often did, particularly when the number of joint parties
was large, the obstacle of what Freund (1897: 23) called ‘concurrent action’
needed to be overcome.
A common solution to this problem was the adoption of a decision-
making procedure such as a majority rule that implied, according to Freund,
a form of separation of control and interest. When associates agreed to this
‘method of representative action’ (Freund, 1897: 23) that he called ‘original
representation’ (Freund, 1897: 24),21 each associate accepted the possibility that
the representatives of the majority in control of the common interests might
initiate actions that theymay not individually desire. The associates’ commitment
to the association, despite this possibility, was therefore of central importance,
as without it the association’s survival over time was uncertain. Indicative of the
level of commitment was the associates’ choice of legal form through which to
collectively pursue their interests.
Without legal form, Freund explained, control over the association’s affairs
could not be secured because the representatives of the majority would be unable
to hold ‘binding power’ over members (Freund, 1897: 21). An association of this
kind would be constantly subject to the possibility of breakup and dissolution.
On the other hand, depending on the chosen legal form, control over the
association’s affairs could be more or less secured, and binding power over
the members more or less established. Freund’s argument was that incident to
the adoption of a particular legal formwas a certain degree of separation between
control and interest, and that the greater the degree of separation the more ‘the
idea of the unity of the association as a holder of rights [was] justified’ (Freund,
1897: 77).
American courts, Freund (1897: 26) observed, effectively recognized ‘features
of unity’ in partnerships, routinely upholding the business convention that ‘each
partner is the representative of the firm’ based on the reasoning that a partnership
may outwardly ‘appear as a unit’ (Freund, 1897: 30), that this ‘outward unity
[wa]s expressed by a collective name and title’ (Freund, 1897: 40), and that in
ordinary business dealings this implied that partnerships contracted their own
debts secured by the property held in common.22 The distinctiveness of the
partnership, he wrote, also ‘assert[ed] itself in equity in the matter of accounting
and especially in the adjustment of individual and partnership liabilities with
21 To be distinguished from ‘representative action under express delegation, by which joint rights are
commonly exercised’ based on the rules of agency, the main problem with ‘the relation between agent
and principal’ being that it ‘[did] not solve entirely the difficulties of concurrent action’ (Freund, 1897:
23–4).
22 As Morawetz and others, including Pepper (1898), had noted.
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their respective preferences as to individual and partnership property’ (Freund,
1897: 26–7).23
An unincorporated partnership, however, could not be said to constitute a
bona fide form of collective holding of property because the separation of control
and interest remained rather weak. While ‘the undivided control of partnership
affairs’ could be somewhat ‘strengthened by contractual stipulations’ (Freund,
1897: 27), partnerships lacked both an absolute protection against ‘express
dissent’ and ‘an unqualified recognition of majority rule’ (Freund, 1897: 28). This
meant that their duration could not be legally guaranteed. Since absolute security
in business dealings with third parties could not be ensured, transactions beyond
the ordinary course of business, where acquired reputations were insufficient,
often proved to be risky for outsiders, and this condemned partnerships to
relatively small sizes.24
By contrast, incorporation implied a complete separation of control and
interest, because undivided control over corporate property lay entirely in the
hands of a ‘governing body’, a board of directors (Freund, 1897: 58), whose
position was ‘different from that of mere agents’ because its binding powers
could not be revoked at any time, even ‘by majority [shareholder] resolutions’
(Freund, 1897: 59). Although specific members of the governing body could be
under some conditions replaced, undivided control over corporate affairs by a
governing body was an incident of the corporate form itself, and this ‘regardless
of the change of persons to whom the interest [was] secured’ (Freund, 1897:
35). In this manner the ‘continuity of the tie binding remaining and incoming
members together’ (Freund, 1897: 46) was ensured.
Properly understood, Freund elaborated, a corporation was a genuine
‘property-holding body’ (Freund, 1897: 42) whose members were ‘not the
part owners of the corporate property, nor part creditors or debtors of the
corporate claims and obligations’ (Freund, 1897: 9–10). Corporate property
was completely separate from the personal property of its members, with the
implication that ‘a member [could] not set off a corporate claim against his own
debt, nor a corporate debtor use a claim against a member for the like purpose’
(Freund, 1897: 10). The fact that these features did not need to be established in
courts but were a matter of statute law provided, from Freund’s point of view,
the ultimate ‘security both against outsiders and against defection on the part
of the members’ (Freund, 1897: 22). This was therefore the primary reason for
choosing the corporate form over the partnership or other forms of collective
holding of property.
23 Civil law jurisdictions, Freund (1897: 27) observed, had gone further by formally recognizing the
separate patrimony of partnerships, with the implication that actions could be brought by and against
partnerships ‘irrespective of changes in membership occurring’.
24 Freund (1897: 28) acknowledged that for business ventures based primarily or exclusively on
personal trust and confidence these defects could in fact be construed as advantages, and indeed ‘an
expression of deliberate legal policy’.
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Arguably, given its ‘unity, distinctiveness, and identity in succession’ (Freund,
1897: 83), the treatment of the corporation as merely as a ‘number of individuals’
(Freund, 1897: 81) was mistaken. Because Morawetz thought that a theory of
corporate existence involved dealing with ‘undemonstrable entities’ (Freund,
1897: 52), he failed to see that it was no more imaginary to treat the corporation
as one, disregarding the separate existence of its members, than it was to treat a
ship as one, disregarding its many separate parts. As long as the corporation was
operative, in order to protect the conditions of undivided control, its members
did not form the objects of separate legal dispositions but shared instead the
‘legal status of the composite thing’ (Freund 1897: 77).25
Thinking of this composite thing as a ‘human agency devoted to distinct
purposes’ (Freund, 1897: 81), without qualifications, was Gierke’s error. There
was no need for metaphysical speculations about the existence and operation
of the corporate will. Instead, in accordance with legal practice, the idea of
‘corporate acting capacity’ (Freund, 1897: 55) could be directly derived from
‘act[s] done by corporate authorities in the corporate name’ (Freund, 1897: 62).
Corporations, after all, became ‘visible and active in and through individuals
only’ (Freund, 1897: 77). As Freund (1897: 52) explained, ‘when we speak of
an act or an attribute as corporate, it is not corporate in the psychologically
collective sense, but merely representative’.
As an instrument of legal reasoning, the ‘idea of vicarious performance’,
Freund (1897: 56) observed, helped ‘determine the incidence of the effects of
legal acts done in the corporate name’ (Freund, 1897: 82). By the same token,
a ‘representative wrong’, such as liability for tort committed by an officer or an
employee, could be established, with responsibility imputed to the ‘corporation
. . . identified with its governing body’ (Freund, 1897: 68). Likewise, ‘in the
case of non-compliance with a statutory regulation or the maintenance of a
nuisance, there [wa]s . . . no reason why an indictment [could] not lie against
the corporation’ itself (Freund, 1897: 69).26 For Freund, the attribution of acts,
both positive and negative, to the corporation, ‘even outside the jurisdiction of
its creation’ (Freund, 1897: 74), was sound legal policy.
The prevailing aggregate view could not conceptually accommodate a policy
of this kind. In this respect, the superiority of Freund’s theory of the corporation
was evident. The corporate form, as Freund had shown, had grown out of the
practical requirement to hold property in a manner that reduced the risks of
internal defection and secured transactions with third parties. Clearly, unless it
was fraudulently ‘organized to hinder and delay creditors’ (Freund, 1897: 79), in
25 Freund (1897: 78) pointed out that there was a difference between fictions based on the ‘neglect
of the irrelevant’, such as the one operating in his analogy of composite things, and fictions involving
‘the substitution of an imaginary conception for a substantial nonentity’, which Morawetz thought were
present in discussions of corporate personality.
26 Although in some cases a ‘collective and mutual moral responsibility’ (Freund, 1897: 69) would
need to be established before criminal penalties could be sought against a corporation.
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which case its acts, and indeed its very incorporation, would be void, ‘the security
of transactions would be seriously impaired’ (Freund, 1897: 55) if acts done in
the corporate name were not systematically attributed to the corporation, that
is, if the corporate person were disregarded at will.
4. Freund’s relevance, then and now
Freund did not purport to address all of the pressing problems of the day,
omitting for instance the topic of corporate taxation and barely mentioning
the matter of limited shareholder liability. But when set against the concerns
of his contemporaries Legal Nature of Corporations was a felicitous book.
Arguably, it provided perhaps the first explanation of and justification for the
separation of ownership and control. As Gregory Mark (1987: 1477) explained,
the ‘justification for management’s assumption of control of corporate affairs’
stemmed from the fact that management’s ‘undivided control was the necessary
outcome of the nature of corporate property holding’ (Mark, 1987: 1474).27
In effect, Freund showed that the separation of ownership and control was a
desirable consequence of incorporation.
If Freund seemed less concerned than others about the negative consequences
of corporate activity it was because his book did more than explain why the
treatment of a corporation as a legal person was necessary to secure corporate
property. It also explained that the treatment of a corporation as a legal person
could help secure public rights against corporations. Liability for torts, nuisances
and non-compliance with regulation could be assigned to corporations precisely
because their distinct legal personality, in effect a point of imputation for both
rights and duties, implied that they appeared in court as singular parties. In this
respect, Freund’s book justified ‘the jurisdiction of state courts over corporate
defendants’ (Carrington, 1994: 488), presaging later developments.
Yet despite the manifest relevance of Freund’s discussion for his
contemporaries’ preoccupations, and notwithstanding an early endorsement by
no less a figure than Pepper (1897), whose review of Clark’s (1897) handbook
based on the aggregate theory invited readers to study the more satisfying
work by Freund, his book received little immediate attention. Some attention
came after Maitland’s translation of Gierke (1900). For instance, it was briefly
mentioned alongside Gierke by Charles B. Elliott (1900). But again, despite
Pepper’s (1901) suggestion that Freund’s analysis was superior to Gierke’s, the
bookwas rarely cited.28 It was overlooked inDavis’ (1905) otherwise penetrating
27 Accordingly, not only did Freund’s book ‘anticipat[e] the classic Berle and Means discussion of
the separation of ownership and control by several decades’ (Mark, 2006: 1485), but ‘Freund’s brilliant
exposition . . . remains the intellectual foundation of the position of management’ (Mark, 1987: 1474).
28 In England, where Maitland cast a long shadow on the development of corporate theory, with
the exception of Cecil Thomas Carr’s (1905: 200) approving mention of ‘a most instructive essay by Dr
Freund’, it seems that Freund’s book was barely noticed.
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study. Freund himself had by this time lost interest in corporate theory, turning
his attention to administrative law and legislation.29
Nearly a decade passed before the first, and at the time only, discussion
of Freund’s book was published. Its author, Philadelphia lawyer George F.
Deiser, devoted several pages to Freund’s book in a series of articles explicitly
attempting to outline a corporate theory without ‘spectral attributes’ that could
provide ‘a working basis for the solution of corporate problems’ (Deiser, 1909:
314).30 From a similar perspective, but without citing Freund, Harvard’s widely
respected John Chipman Gray (1909: 54) argued that Jhering’s conception of
rights as legally protected interests could be mobilized to explain the issue of
corporate liability without the ‘dogmatic speculations’ associated with Gierke:
legal duties could be imposed on corporations ‘to protect the rights of other
persons, including the rights of individual members of the corporation’. Freund
would have agreed.
The search for legal solutions to economic and social problems runs through
his concern with what he called the ‘problem of intelligent legislation’ (Freund,
1907). As the noted legal philosopherMorris R. Cohen (1937: 316–17) observed,
‘Freund . . . always sought to find a genuinely rational pattern’ that might ‘help
to clear the ground of much legal superstition’ and ‘supply illuminating ideas on
the direction in which the law can wisely be pushed’. Freund (1900: 27) believed
that the ‘striking . . . lack of uniformity’ between state laws on all manner of
issues meant that the appropriate direction, at least as an ‘ideal in legislation’
(Freund, 1917: 248), involved standardization. But he knew that attempts to
achieve uniformity of local legislation were often unsuccessful, particularly ‘as
regards corporate organization, powers, relations, and liabilities’ (Freund, 1917:
169).
These considerations played an important role in the debates surrounding the
legal status of unincorporated associations such as partnerships.31 The judicial
recognition of the mercantile view of partnerships as de facto legal persons was
widespread, as Freund andmany others had acknowledged.32 But the recognition
of the partnership’s rights and liabilities as distinct from those of the partners,
and the subordination of the latter to the former, was far from uniform. This
created some uncertainty, particularly in matters of interstate commerce. Like
Columbia’s Francis M. Burdick (1909) and others, Freund (1912: 107) claimed
29 There are sections and chapters on corporations in his major works but nothing resembling
corporate theory. Legal Nature of Corporations was never cited in subsequent work.
30 Writing around the time when the Supreme Court’s ruling in New York Central Hudson River
Railroad v. United States, 212 US 481 (1909) sanctioned the idea that corporations could be subjected to
criminal prosecution, Deiser was particularly interested in theoretical justifications for attributing liability
to large corporations (Hager, 1989).
31 The legal status of trade unions was also under discussion.
32 A long list of such cases was compiled by William Hamilton Cowles (1903).
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that the situation called for a uniform partnership law that ‘recognize[d] the firm
as formal holder of rights’, especially as regards to property.33
The drafters of the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 attempted to agree, as its
chief drafter William Draper Lewis (1911: 100) explained, on ‘such fundamental
matters as the legal nature of a partnership, the rights of the members in
partnership property, or even their relation to third persons’, but failed to do so
in a logically coherent manner, as Scott Rowley (1916), Judson Adams Crane
(1916) and other commentators pointed out. The Act did not formally define
the partnership as a legal person, and its language was ambiguous: it recognized
that partnerships as such could hold property but at the same time that partners
were co-owners of this property.34 In the words of Michigan’s Joseph H. Drake
(1917: 626), the statute recognized ‘the composite entity of the group and not
the unit entity of an extrinsic juristic person’.
It would take 80 years for this anomaly to be settled in a manner that Freund
would have approved of: the formal definition of the partnership as ‘an entity
distinct from its partners’ was enshrined in the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act of 1994 (§201a). Among other things the new statute provided that the
partnership property was owned by the legal entity rather than by the partners,
meaning that partners were no longer co-owners of this property; that this
property was protected from both the partners and their creditors; and that
the partnership was not dissolved in the event of partner dissociation (Ribstein,
2010; Vermeulen, 2003). Freund would have appreciated the considerable
enhancement of the separation of control and interest, but would have noted
that the separation remained relatively weak.
He would have underlined the fact that the presence of a governing body with
undivided control over partnership property was not an incident of this new
partnership form.35 Although he would have acknowledged that partners might
form a board by contractual stipulation he would certainly have pointed out
that it would be impossible to guarantee either an absolute protection against
express dissent or an unqualified recognition of majority rule. Indeed, Freund
would have argued, the Act (§401j) provided that partnership affairs were to
be governed by majority rule only in the ordinary course of business, beyond
which this method of representative action was replaced by unanimity. Hence the
33 As Freund (1904: 356) had explained, the status of partnerships and unincorporated associations
was ‘uncertain and unsatisfactory’ because ‘the right to hold property in corporate capacity’ could not be
completely guaranteed by contractual stipulations between the members.
34 The Act also did not achieve consistency with existing legislation such as the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, which clearly construed partnerships as falling under the category of ‘persons’ alongside
corporations.
35 This does not mean that partnerships typically lack a governing body but simply that its presence
is not required by law (Kraakman et al., 2009). The flexibility of partnership law implies that partners
can unanimously resolve to form a board, just as they can subsequently choose to remove it.
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separation of control and interest could never be complete. For those in search
of greater security Freund would have recommended the corporate form.
Despite differences in terminology Hansmann and his colleagues would no
doubt accept this logic. Arguably, Freund’s relatively simple framework shares
much in common with the more sophisticated recent scholarship on firms and
legal entities. In the main, Freund’s contrast between weak and strong degrees
of separation between control and interest is very similar to Hansmann et al.’s
(2006) distinction between weak and strong degrees of entity shielding. In both
cases the distinction revolves around the idea that what really matters for a
meaningful comparison of alternative business associations is not limited liability
but the degree to which an association’s property is secured against both insiders
and outsiders.36 In both cases the essential role played by law in this respect is
emphasized.
To accomplish this task Freund rejected the claim popular among his
contemporaries that the corporation’s separate personality was a misleading
fiction in the same way that Hansmann and his colleagues distanced themselves
from a similar concern raised by prior contributors to the economic analysis of
corporate law. And by distinguishing the 19th-century literature on corporate
personality, which was ‘principally concerned with . . . the power of the state
versus the power of private organizations, or the nature of group will’, and
their own approach, which adopted a ‘simpler, clearer, and more functional’
view that emphasized ‘separate patrimony as a key characteristic of a juridical
person’, Hansmann and Kraakman (2000a: 439) unwittingly recognized Freund
and his property perspective as an early example of their functional approach.
Of course, there are substantial differences between the two frameworks.
Most notably, Freund had little to say about creditor rights and the liquidation
protection that for Hansmann et al. is what defines the strong entity-shielding
characteristic of the corporate form. And while Freund acknowledged that
the subordination of personal to business claims in both partnerships and
corporations was important his argument did not depend on this issue. Although
he understood that transactions that were poorly or insufficiently secured were
uncertain, his discussion was framed in neither the language of transaction costs
nor the logic of efficiency.37 He also focusedmore on the benefits of the corporate
form than he did on the costs. But without having the shoulders of giants to stand
on his analysis was, quite remarkably, on the right track.
A case can be made for the fact that, intuitively, Freund had the mind of
an institutional economist, and formulated his argument in the spirit of what
would become, following Coase, the theory of the firm. Granted, he did not
identify the cost advantage that an association may have over ordinary market
36 Freund clearly viewed limited liability as secondary but did not provide a justification, unlike
Hansmann et al.
37 Of course, few (if any) economists, let alone lawyers, reasoned in these terms at the time.
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exchange, but he did assume, in line with Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz’s
(1972) thinking, that an association of resource owners would only exist if it was
possible to generate a super-additive surplus. He then focused on how to best
safeguard this mutually beneficial interest despite some of the collective action
and commitment problems involved, and this led him to compare alternative
institutional arrangements in light of the degree to which they helped prevent
the potential failure of cooperation.
The consequences of internal defection were greatest in forms of association
where control was jointly exercised and concurrent action was necessary, he
reasoned, but even when joint control and concurrent action were no longer
strictly necessary because a majority decision rule had been adopted, the problem
of internal defection remained. To be truly protected from internal defection,
associations had to exercise control over the combined resources in a manner
that ensured the continuity of the tie binding remaining and incoming members
together. To paraphraseOliver Hart (1995), some sort of glue was needed to hold
the association together over time. Freund realized that contractual arrangements
alone would not suffice. He therefore turned his attention to the main legal forms
of association available, and more specifically to the corporate form.
Incorporation vested ownership of the combined resources in the legal entity,
and attributed unified control over corporate property to a board whose binding
powers could survive changes in the association’s membership. This was not just
the best way to ensure the association’s continuity but also the best way to secure
transactions with outside parties. Blair and Stout (1999) would concur. There
are clear parallels between Freund’s reasoning and their team production theory
of corporate law. Moreover, as Blair (2003) argued, the possibility of locking
capital in was precisely what corporate law achieved for business organizers at
the time when Freund was writing. Corporations were thus able to accumulate
the specific investments that came to define advanced industrial economies.
5. Conclusions
Freund’s Legal Nature of Corporations has rightly been identified as a brilliant
exposition of the theoretical underpinnings of corporate law that was well
ahead of its time (Carrington, 1994; Harris, 2006; Horwitz, 1985; Mark, 1987;
Millon, 1990). But prior to the detailed discussion proposed in this paper, a
systematic assessment of the book’s contributions remained unavailable. As a
result, Freund’s recognition as an important but unjustly neglected corporate
theorist has long been overdue. This paper has shown that Freund’s property
perspective on the corporate form helped establish analytically the role played
by the corporation’s distinct legal personality and offered, among other things,
perhaps the first explanation of the separation of ownership and control, along
with perhaps the first justification for the assignment of liability to corporations.
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These significant results were the product of Freund’s distinctively analytical
approach and his commitment to the rational study of law. Remarkably, Freund’s
study of the ends sought by corporate law and the reasons for desiring them
was based on a seemingly intuitive understanding of what today would be
called comparative institutional analysis, implicitly formulated in the spirit of
the typical theory of the firm narrative. Freund assessed the main legal forms
of association available at the time in terms of the degree to which they
protected the members’ combined property against the risks of internal defection
while securing transactions with outside parties, and showed that contractual
stipulations among partners could never provide the kind of security afforded
by the corporate form as a matter of law.
Freund hence anticipated by roughly a century the main thrust of recent
scholarship on the firm. As demonstrated in this paper, despite differences in
terminology and emphasis, Freund’s comparative assessment of partnerships
and corporations in terms of the degree of separation of control and interest
foreshadowed Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire’s (2006) distinction between
weak and strong entity shielding. And his claim that the advantage of the
complete separation of control over and interest in property characteristic of the
corporate form was to be found in the undivided control over corporate affairs
by a governing body prefigured Blair’s (2004) similar point. The resemblance
between Freund’s reasoning and the logic underlying Blair and Stout’s (1999)
team production theory of corporate law is equally striking.
The fact that Freund deserves to be recognized as a precursor of today’s
rational study of corporate law underscores just how much ahead of its time his
book really was. But it also raises the question of why, given all that it had to
offer, references to Freund’s corporate theory are all but absent in the literature.
Part of the responsibility lies with commentators who have mispresented Freund
as the leading American exponent of Gierke’s theory, claiming that ‘moderate[s]
. . . tried to establish positions . . . between the extremes presented by Freund and
Morawetz’ (Bratton, 1989: 1508). A more careful reading, however, shows that
Freund discarded the dubious aspects of Gierke’s theory, and is more accurately
described as a moderate between the extreme positions defended by Gierke and
Morawetz. This paper sets the record straight in that respect.
Regardless, the book’s fate was probably sealed from the outset not simply by
the scarce attention it received in the years following its publication but because
Freund, reacting perhaps to the feeling that his ideas had a ‘less receptive audience
than they deserved’ among lawyers ‘unused to abstract and theoretical legal
analysis’ (Reitz, 1993: 431), never returned to corporate theory, or even cited
his book in subsequent work. Since Freund did not remain an ‘active player’
in corporate law discourse, the prospects of his book being remembered, let
alone canonized, were meager (Harris, 2006: 1435). One can only wonder what
course the literature on corporations might have taken had Freund remained,
while pursuing his other endeavours, an active participant in the debate.
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